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Justice Department’s New Position on Patents, Standard Setting, 
and Injunctions 
Herbert Hovenkamp 
REGULATORY REVIEW Jan. 6, 2019 
 
 
 
 
A new policy statement from the federal government contradicts 
established law on whether patentees can seek injunctions. 
Photo: https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/photo/computer-chip-
repair-and-soldering-of-the-scheme-royalty-free-image/1125769029  
 
A deep split in American innovation policy has arisen between new 
economy and old economy innovation. In a recent policy statement, 
the Antitrust Division of the Justice Department takes a position that 
tilts more toward the old economy.  
 
In the old economy, networks play a smaller role. Products are covered 
by relatively few patents and individually the patents are durable 
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because the products do not change all that rapidly. For example, a 
drug might be covered by a single principal patent on its molecule, and 
the drug might continue to be valuable long after its patent expired. 
This is true, for example, of Aspirin, Tylenol, and Ibuprofen. All 
became generic years ago but are still commercially viable on the 
market. 
 
Information technologies are different in several respects. First, the 
sheer number of information technology patents is overwhelming. A 
common smartphone incorporates tens of thousands of them.  
 
Second, these patents are often difficult to interpret, have high 
invalidity rates, and rapid obsolescence. Nevertheless, the cost of 
challenging them in litigation is high.  
 
Finally, many information devices require interoperability with other 
devices made by different manufacturers.  This usually requires 
producers to obtain many patent licenses from others. 
 
Many of today’s information technology industries, including cellular 
phones, computers, avionics and digital direction finders, video 
recorders and players, and televisions, among others, are covered by 
standard setting organizations (SSOs) intended to protect 
interoperability. A company might build a smartphone with the 
world’s best features, but if it cannot be hooked into the system and 
connect with other phones it will be worthless. SSOs composed of 
many firms try to achieve interoperability, and usually they do so quite 
well. 
 
The technologies adopted by new-economy SSOs are covered by many 
patents, and manufacturers who produce under these standards need 
access to them. SSOs require firms that want to be involved in setting 
the standard to license their patents out on “fair, reasonable, and 
nondiscriminatory” (FRAND) terms. These patents are called 
“standard essential patents,” or SEPs.  
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When a firm makes a FRAND commitment, it promises two things 
that the patent laws themselves do not require. First, it promises that it 
will license its patents to all firms who operate on the standard set by 
the SSO. Second, it promises it will offer its license on fair reasonable, 
and nondiscriminatory rates. If the parties cannot agree on a royalty, 
the dispute will be submitted to an independent third party such as a 
court or arbitrator. Nonparticipants are not required to submit patents 
to the FRAND system, but they then face the prospect that their 
technology will not be adopted as a standard. The structure of this 
system simply reflects rational behavior on the part of manufacturers.  
They prefer standards calling for technologies with known costs and 
guaranteed access. 
 
Policing the FRAND process involves a combination of contract law, 
patent law, and sometimes antitrust law. As a result, both the Antitrust 
Division of the U.S. Department of Justice and the U.S. Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC) could get involved. Today there is a growing rift 
between the two agencies over how the FRAND process should 
function. The FTC tilts toward policies that favor new-economy 
informational technologies and places a premium on cooperative 
development. By contrast, the Justice Department is increasingly 
leaning toward old-economy perspectives that interpret cooperative 
agreements narrowly. 
 
One divisive issue concerns when SSO participants who own standard 
essential patents may obtain an injunction against a patent infringer. 
Under the Patent Act, patent infringement is penalized by damages, 
but it can also lead to an injunction in some cases. A FRAND 
commitment, however, requires the patent owner to license to all 
participants in the standard upon payment of a FRAND royalty. The 
participants who use the technology required to meet the standard 
generally want a guarantee that they will not later be found to be 
infringers and forced to shut some of their technology down. By 
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contrast, the patent holders may reasonably expect to receive a 
FRAND royalty once an amount has been properly determined. 
 
In December 2019, the Justice Department, the U.S. Patent and 
Trademark Office, and the National Institute of Standards and 
Technology issued a formal policy statement on remedies for SEPs. 
The new statement declares that injunctions should be available for 
SEPs on the same terms as for patents generally. It also states in a 
footnote that the antitrust laws are not generally applicable to FRAND 
disputes.  
 
The policy statement as a whole contains two problems: one is glaring 
omission, and the other is that  what it says about antitrust liability is 
not a completely correct statement of the law. Both of these problems 
are highly relevant to the closely watched FTC v. Qualcomm litigation 
currently pending in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. 
 
The glaring omission in the policy statement is that it says absolutely 
nothing about the conduct of patent holders. The Patent Act authorizes 
injunctions “in accordance with the principles of equity.” For centuries 
it has been governed by the principle that if plaintiffs want a court to 
force the defendant to do the right thing, then plaintiffs must be doing 
the right thing themselves: “He who seeks equity must do equity.”  
Under this rule, which is often called “unclean hands,” if a person is 
violating an ethical principle himself, then he cannot obtain an 
injunction from someone else. This rule has nothing to do with 
antitrust law and is not even limited to patent law. In the context of 
FRAND disputes, though, the rule becomes relevant when a patent 
owner seeks an injunction on a SEP but is not doing the things it has 
promised to do as a condition of having its patents declared standard 
essential.  
 
In the current Qualcomm dispute, the FTC found that the company 
violated its FRAND obligation. Qualcomm refused to license its 
standard essential patents to competitors and refused to issue 
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“exhaustive” licenses that impose no restrictions on subsequent 
product use. Furthermore, Qualcomm has insisted on certain types of 
“loyalty” as a condition for licensing, including prohibitions on the use 
of competitors’ technology. Qualcomm used all of these requirements 
as leverage to obtain royalties that are well above the FRAND rate 
earned by better-behaved participants. All of this conduct is on the 
same patents for which Qualcomm might seek an injunction. The 
government’s policy statement should have explained why the 
doctrine of unclean hands—which clearly applies in the Qualcomm 
case—would not prohibit a serial FRAND violator from obtaining an 
injunction. 
 
On the issue of antitrust liability, the Justice Department is authorized 
to enforce the antitrust laws and certainly has the discretion not to 
prosecute a violation that occurs in the licensing of FRAND patents.  
But the FTC and private plaintiffs also have authority to enforce the 
antitrust laws. Although it is true that a FRAND dispute concerns a 
contract, the reason why a patentee is holding out for an injunction 
may nevertheless be anticompetitive, and the antitrust laws could 
clearly apply.  In the Qualcomm case, a district court has already 
concluded that many of the company’s FRAND-violating practices 
listed above also violate the antitrust laws—and on conventional 
antitrust grounds that have nothing to do with FRAND. For example, 
if the threat of an injunction is being used to enforce illegal tying, 
exclusive dealing, or another anticompetitive practice, that conduct 
will be fully reachable under the antitrust laws. 
 
Guidelines from the government are very useful when they state the 
law or an agency’s own enforcement position, or when they clarify 
ambiguities. But they are not legislation. Although they might bind the 
agencies who issue them, they do not bind others, particularly not 
when they are in conflict with law that is clearly established. 
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